The Complexity of Corruption: Nature and Ethical Suggestions

Reyes Calderón and Jose Luis Alvarez Arce
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Reyes Calderón: Facultad de Económicas, Universidad de Navarra
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Reyes Calderón

No 05/06, Faculty Working Papers from School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra

Abstract: Corruption is a well-established research topic which increasingly attracts interest, as attested by a growing body of literature. Nevertheless, disagreements persist not only about how to curve it, but even about its definition, causes and consequences. Such a lack of consensus reflects the complexity of the problem, a feature which is often cited but rarely analyzed. This paper aims to fill that gap. In particular, we first address the nature of corruptions complexity by offering and analyzing an inventory of generators of complexity compiled from the available literature. Secondly, our paper draws from the key conclusions of that analysis to shed some light on the complex role played by corporations on corruption. Finally, we suggest that ethical aspects have to be considered in order to clarify many complex dilemmas around corruption and illuminate the corporate role in both domestic and foreign business activity.

JEL-codes: K42 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2006-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:una:unccee:wp0506

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