International tax cooperation and sovereign debt crisis resolution: reforming global governance to ensure no one is left behind

Jose Alonso Rodriguez

CDP Background Papers from United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs

Abstract: The paper focuses on two crucial issues that hinder the fiscal sovereignty of developing countries: the reduced level of international tax cooperation, and the lack of appropriate procedures for sovereign debt crisis resolution. The low level of international tax cooperation enables a ‘race to the bottom’ in tax rates among countries, tax avoidance through profit-shifting activities by companies and tax evasion by individuals and companies, based on the existence of non-cooperative jurisdictions. In the last five years, the international community has made some improvements in this field, but the situation remains far from satisfactory. On the other hand, the current procedure for sovereign debt resolution, through negotiations at the Paris Club with the support of the IMF, is not only unfair, but also inefficient. The paper explores alternatives in both fields. Appropriate responses to these international problems would have to show benefits in terms of efficiency and welfare at the global level, and establish fundamentals for countries to take full advantage of their resources, which is a necessary condition for funding policies that will not leave (or push) any nation or social sector behind.

Keywords: tax system; international tax cooperation; tax avoidance; tax evasion; tax havens; external debt; restructuring debt; sovereign debt resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 F34 F38 F55 F65 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm, nep-mac, nep-opm, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:une:cpaper:041

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