Existence and comparative statics in heterogeneous Cournot Oligopolies

Steffen Hoernig

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We prove the existence of symmetric pure Cournot equilibria with heterogeneous goods under the following condition: each firm reacts to a rise in competirors output in such a way that its market price does not rise. This condition is not related to wether goods are strategic substitutes or complements. We establish that maximum and minimum equilibrium prices are decreasing as more firms enter if competitors outputs enter inverse demand aggregated; for non-aggregative demand prices may increase. Total quantity increases only if each firm's market price is more affected by its own output than competitors outputs.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; product differentiton; entry; comparative statics; single-crossing condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Existence and Comparative Statics in Heterogeneous Cournot Oligopolies (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp388

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