On the existence of pure strategy nash equilibria in large games

Guilherme Carmona

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colells theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an " pure, " equilibrium for all " > 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colells existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.

Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the existence of pure strategy nash equilibria in large games (2006)
Working Paper: On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp465

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