On a theorem by Mas-Colell

Guilherme Carmona

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We consider anonymous games with a Lebesgue space of players in which either the action space or players' characteristics are denumer- able. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilib- rium strategies. This result, together with Mas-Colell (1984)'s theorem, implies that any continuous, denumerable game has an equilibrium strategy. In particular, the theorems of Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) can be obtained as corollaries of Mas-Colell's.

Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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