Intermediate preferences and behavioral conformity in large games

Guilherme Carmona

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate prefer- ences. We show that any such game has a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the set of attributes into a bounded number of convex sets with the following property: all players with an attribute in the interior of the same element of the partition play the same action. Furthermore, if the game induces an absolutely continuous distribution (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) on the attribute space, then we can strengthen the conclusion by showing that all players with an attribute in the same element of the partition play the same action.

Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp523

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