The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?

João Vareda () and Steffen Hoernig ()

FEUNL Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia

Abstract: We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges ?rms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay ?rst investment. While ?rst-best investment cannot be achieved with a ?xed access tari¤, simple instruments such as banning access in the future, or granting access holidays right after investment, can improve e¢ ciency. The former forces investment when it would happen too late, while the latter allows for lower access charges in order to delay the second investment when it would happen too early.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2007/wp524.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: The Race for Telecoms Infrastructure Investment with Bypass: Can Access Regulation Achieve the First-best? (2007)
Working Paper: The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best? (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp524

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FEUNL Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Susana Lopes ().