The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: can access regulation achieve the first best?

João Vareda () and Steffen Hoernig

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges ?rms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay ?rst investment. While ?rst-best investment cannot be achieved with a ?xed access tari , simple instruments such as banning access in the future, or granting access holidays right after investment, can improve e ciency. The former forces investment when it would happen too late, while the latter allows for lower access charges in order to delay the second investment when it would happen too early.

Keywords: Access pricing; investments; preemption; access ban; access holidays (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D92 L43 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Race for Telecoms Infrastructure Investment with Bypass: Can Access Regulation Achieve the First-best? (2007)
Working Paper: The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp524

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