Debt, Information Asymmetry and Bankers on Board
Joao Amaro de Matos and
FEUNL Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia
We provide evidence that the presence of bankers in the board of directors reduce information asymmetry between credit markets and fi rms. We show that the impact of the presence of bankers on leverage is driven by firms with low level of debt. This eff ect is amplifi ed the more connected the bankers are to the corporate world. Additionally the results are more pronounced for less transparent firms. Our findings suggest that the connectedness of bankers play a key role in reducing information asymmetry. JEL codes: G32, G21, D82, L14
Keywords: information asymmetry; debt level; social networks; corporate boards; bankers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp597
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in FEUNL Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Susana Lopes ().