Cheap talk with multiple strategically interacting audiences: An experimental study

X. Li and Ronald Peeters
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X. Li: Microeconomics & Public Economics

No 35, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent firm (the sender) is endowed with incentives to understate the true size of the market demand to two potential entrants (the receivers). Although our experimental data reveals that senders' messages convey truthful information and this is picked up by the receivers, this overcommunication (relative to standard theoretical prediction) does not enhance efficient entry levels (and payoffs) to beyond what can be achieved without any communication. The reason is that receivers fail to optimally translate the information received in their entry decision, possibly due to overcautiousness.

Date: 2013-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Cheap Talk with Multiple Strategically Interacting Audiences: An Experimental Study (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013035

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013035

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