Social Identity and Group Contests
Henrik Zaunbrecher and
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Henrik Zaunbrecher: General Economics 1 (Micro)
No 24, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
Social identity has been shown to successfully enhance cooperation and effort in cooperation and coordination games. Little is known about the causal effect of social identity on the propensity to engage in group conflict. In this paper we explore theoretically and experimentally whether social identity increases investments in group contests. We show theoretically that increased social identity with the own group implies higher investments in Tullock contests. Empirically we find that induced social identity does increase group closeness but does not increase conflict investments.
Keywords: social identity; group; contest; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-mic and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016024
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