How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?
Burak Can (),
Péter Csóka () and
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Emre Ergin: General Economics 1 (Micro)
No 8, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a novel class of threshold rules are characterized by these criteria. The rules impose that a delegation is chosen when its combined support in the society first reaches a particular percentage of the public opinion - depending on the size of the delegation. Conversely, minority opinions that are not reflected in the delegation should always be below a threshold, which follows a geometric series.
Keywords: aggregation rules; committee selection; conflict management; Kemeny Distance; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2017008
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