Multi-Battle n-Player Dynamic Contests
Nejat Anbarci (),
Kutay Cingiz and
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Kutay Cingiz: General Economics 0 (Onderwijs)
Mehmet Ismail: department of political economy, king's college london
No 3, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
In presidential primaries, proportional campaign resource allocation to states with respect to their delegate numbers is a desirable concept. To study proportionality, we introduce a novel model for n-player multi-battle dynamic contests. We show that when players maximize their expected number of delegates there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which players allocate their resources proportionally. However for at least 4 number of states and at least 2 delegates, when players maximize their probability of winning, there is always a distribution of delegates over the states such that population proportionality is not satisfied.
Keywords: Presidential elections; dynamic contests; presedential primaries; population proportionality; multi-battle contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018003
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