Random social choice functions for single-peaked domains on trees

Hans Peters, Souvik Roy () and Soumyarup Sadhukhan

No 4, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: Finitely many agents have single-peaked preferences on a finite set of alternatives structured as a tree. Under a richness condition on the domain we characterize all unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions. These functions are uniquely determined by the values they assign to preference profiles where all peaks are on leafs of the tree.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018004

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018004

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