Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms

Bas Dietzenbacher and Hans Peters

No 6, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper takes an axiomatic bargaining approach to bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by characterizing bankruptcy rules in terms of properties from bargaining theory. In particular, we derive new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional rule, the truncated proportional rule, and the constrained relative equal awards rule using properties which concern changes in the estate or the claims.

JEL-codes: C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms (2022)
Working Paper: Characterizing NTU-Bankruptcy Rules using Bargaining Axioms (2018)
Working Paper: Characterizing NTU-Bankruptcy Rules using Bargaining Axioms (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2018006

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2018006

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