Your Failure is My Opportunity - Eff ects of Elimination in Contests

Moritz Mendel, Ferdinand Pieroth and Christian Seel

No 16, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a sequence of multi-prize all-pay auctions, where the contestants who exert the lowest e fforts in a round are eliminated. We analyze if and how the behavior of contestants is influenced by the possibility that strong rivals are eliminated along the way. The conditions under which behavior is not influenced are rather restrictive. For cases where these conditions are not met, we derive equilibria in a two-period model. We compare our equilibrium predictions to those of a static model and a two-stage contest where the sequential structure is not announced in the first round.

JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/34672592/RM19016.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Your failure is my opportunity—Effects of elimination in contests (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2019016

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2019016

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