Persuading Strategic Voters
P. Jean-Jacques Herings () and
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Toygar Kerman: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, Microeconomics & Public Economics
Dominik Karos: RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, Microeconomics & Public Economics
No 4, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
A Sender wants to persuade multiple Receivers with homogeneous preferences and a common belief about the state of the world to vote in favor of a proposal. Prior to the vote Sender commits to a communication strategy which sends private, potentially correlated, signals to Receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. While Sender benefits from using private messages rather than public communication if Receivers vote sincerely, under the optimal communication strategy, sincere voting is not in any Receiver’s best interest. If the proposal does not require unanimous agreement, Sender’s optimal communication strategy after which sincere voting indeed constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is such that no voter is ever pivotal.
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gen, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2020004
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