Uniqueness of Clearing Payment Matrices in Financial Networks
Péter Csóka () and
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ()
No 14, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
We study bankruptcy problems in financial networks in the presence of general bankruptcy laws. The set of clearing payment matrices is shown to be a lattice, which guarantees the existence of a greatest and a least clearing payment. Multiplicity of clearing payment matrices is both a theoretical and a practical concern. We present a new condition for uniqueness that generalizes all the existing conditions proposed in the literature. Our condition depends on the decomposition of the financial network into strongly connected components. A strongly connected component which contains more than one agent is called a cycle and the involved agents are called cyclical agents. If there is a cycle without successors, then one of the agents in such a cycle should have a positive endowment. The division rule used by a cyclical agent with a positive endowment should be positive monotonic and the rule used by a cyclical agent with a zero endowment should be strictly monotonic. Since division rules involving priorities are not positive monotonic, uniqueness of the clearing payment matrix is a much bigger concern for such division rules than for proportional ones. We also show how uniqueness of clearing payment matrices is related to continuity of bankruptcy rules.
JEL-codes: C71 G10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf, nep-net and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Uniqueness of Clearing Payment Matrices in Financial Networks (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2021014
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().