Tournaments as collective decisions

Ton Storcken
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Ton Storcken: RS: FSE DKE Mathematics Centre Maastricht, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 15, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: Unless all tournaments are admissible as individual preferences, we show that, structure diversity of the range of a Pareto-optimal, neutral, non-dictatorial, and independent of irrelevant alternatives preference rules is greater than the structure diversity in the individual preferences upon which these preference rules are based.

Date: 2021-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2021015

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2021015

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