The equal split-off set for NTU-games

Bas Dietzenbacher and Elena Yanovskaya

No 2, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper introduces and studies the equal split-off set for cooperative games with nontransferable utility. We illustrate the new solution for the famous Roth-Shafer examples and present two axiomatic characterizations based on different consistency properties on the class of exact partition games, i.e. the class of games where it intersects the core. Moreover, we provide explicit expressions for the class of bargaining problems and the class of bankruptcy problems.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/78505501/RM22002.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: The equal split-off set for NTU-games (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2022002

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2022002

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