Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher and Yuki Tamura
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Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 9, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.

JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mfd and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2023009

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2023009

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