Maximal matchings

Anh Triêu, Iwan Bos, Marc Schröder and Dries Vermeulen
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Anh Triêu: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Marc Schröder: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 4, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: There are many situations in which policymakers are primarily concerned with the availability and accessibility of goods or services. Examples include electricity, food, housing, medical supplies, et cetera. In such cases, the social goal may be to maximize the number of transactions, which we refer to as a maximal matching. This paper presents a mechanism that implements this objective. The mechanism satisfies the incentive and participation constraints, but requires external funding.

JEL-codes: C72 D47 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2024004

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2024004

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