Equal treatment of unsatisfied agents

Doudou Gong and Bas Dietzenbacher
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Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 10, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: In many models of resource allocation, agents are characterized by certain rights, needs, or demands. We impose the requirement that all agents who are not fully compensated are assigned the same amount, and explore it in the models of claims problems, division problems with single-peaked preferences, and division problems with single-dipped preferences. In combination with other well-known properties, we obtain respective axiomatizations of the well- known constrained equal awards rule, the uniform rule, and two families of rules for the single-dipped model.

JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2024010

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2024010

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