Core bound reduced games and consistency

Doudou Gong and Bas Dietzenbacher
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Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 2, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: The lower and upper exact core bounds describe the minimum and maximum individual payoffs with in the core of a balanced game, respectively. Based on these bounds, we introduce lower and upper core bound reduced games and study the relation with other reduced games. We axiomatically characterize new solutions for balanced games as unique core bound consistent extensions of the classical two-player principles unanimity, standardness, and constrained egalitarianism. We name these solutions core covers, equal gap values, and constrained equality values.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2025002

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2025002

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