Sharing money with a status quo: the uniform rule

Xiuxia Yin and Bas Dietzenbacher
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Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 2, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper studies the allocation of a perfectly divisible good among agents with a status quo payoff. The aggregate status quo payoff may exceed the total amount to be shared or fall short. We introduce and analyze the uniform rule which divides as equally as possible provided that either all agents lose or all agents win with respect to their status quo payoff. We provide several axiomatic characterizations based on contraction and expansion properties. On the domains of claims problems and surplus problems, our results offer some new characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal welfare rule, respectively.

Keywords: resource allocation; status quo; uniform rule; axiomatic analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2026002

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026002

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