Core selection with single-peaked preferences and endowment ownership

Bas Dietzenbacher, Pauline Hanssen and Yuki Tamura
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Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Pauline Hanssen: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 5, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper studies reallocation problems where preferences are single-peaked and one agent is endowed with one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. We characterize all allocations that belong to the core, i.e. no group of agents is better off by reallocating among themselves. Under excess supply, we show that all rules satisfying Pareto optimality and individual rationality select from the strong core. Under excess demand, we show that all rules satisfying Pareto optimality, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness select from the weak core, but there is no strategy-proof rule that selects from the strong core.

Keywords: resource reallocation; single-peaked preferences; weak core; strong core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2026005

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026005

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