Egalitarian reallocation when preferences are single-peaked

Bas Dietzenbacher, Pauline Hanssen and Yuki Tamura
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Bas Dietzenbacher: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory
Pauline Hanssen: RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

No 14, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: This paper studies egalitarian reallocation when preferences are single-peaked and each agent is endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non- disposable commodity. We focus on the distributional criteria Lorenz domination and variance domination. We show that a new rule, the egalitarian uniform rule, is the unique Pareto optimal and individually rational rule that Lorenz dominates and variance dominates all other rules satisfying these properties.

Keywords: resource reallocation; single-peaked preferences; egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2026014

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2026014

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