Social Sorting

Robin Cowan and Nicolas Jonard ()

No 35, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT)

Abstract: This paper is about the behaviour of a society in which learning individuals play a Prisoner’s Dilemma that guides social promotion and demotion. The direct effect of the payoff-based socialization that is implemented here is segregation. However, segregation permits the survival of cooperation as it (unintendedly) preserves cooperators from detrimental interactions with defectors. Very large amounts of cooperation can be observed in the long run.

Keywords: microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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