Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational Rents, and Procurement Management

Véronique Flambard, Pierre Lasserre and Pierre Mohnen

No 23, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT)

Abstract: Using semiparametric and nonparametric estimation techniques we infer cost distributions and informational rents from 457 snow removal contracts o¤ered for tender by the City of Montreal. Our results are compatible with standard received theory of competitive auctions: there is a positive correlation between costs and bids, and rents increase with the variance of costs. Bids and costs have decreased over the sample period while rents remained relatively constant. The City deserves credit for these results, as it has succeeded in exploiting economies of scale and triggering innovations while maintaining competition. Further, it has been successful in adjusting its reserve prices to keep up with the decreasing cost of snow removal.

Keywords: microeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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https://unu-merit.nl/publications/rmpdf/2004/rm2004-023.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, informational rents, and procurement management (2007)
Working Paper: Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational Rents, and Procurement Management (2007)
Working Paper: Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, informational rents, and procurement management (2007)
Working Paper: Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational Rents, and Procurement Management (2004)
Working Paper: Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational Rents, and Procurement Management (2001)
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