EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Corruption and tax morale in Africa

Amadou Boly, Maty Konte () and Abebe Abebe

No 2019-042, MERIT Working Papers from United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT)

Abstract: This paper analyses the effect of the quality of governance (proxied by perceived corruption) on attitude towards paying tax. Using the Afrobarometer surveys from 36 African countries over the period 2011-2015, we find that low perception of corruption of different levels of the Executive branch (President Office, Government Officials or Tax Authorities) has a significant and positive impact on tax morale. To account for possible reverse causality between a citizen's perception of governance quality and attitude towards tax payment, we also propose an IV approach, using the ethnicity of the country's leader as instrument for perceived level of corruption. The IV results confirm that an individual's positive perception of governance has a positive impact on its willingness to pay tax.

Keywords: Corruption; Taxation; Governance; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H71 O23 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-iue, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2019/wp2019-042.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:unumer:2019042

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MERIT Working Papers from United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ad Notten ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2024-03-31
Handle: RePEc:unm:unumer:2019042