A Stock Targeting International Carbon-Tax Rule with Uncertainty and Diminishing Compliance
Amnon Levy ()
Economics Working Papers from School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia
This paper develops a rule for setting periodically and internationally a carbon-dioxide atmospheric stock limiting tax in a world inhabited by expected utility maximizing stakeholders facing diminishing mean and increasing variance of their output level due to climate change. The stakeholders are classified as poor, hence unable and/or unwilling to pay, countries and rich countries. Due to ideological and cultural differences, the rich countries' willingness to pay the tax is not identical. Consequently, the number of complying rich countries diminishes with the tax level.
Keywords: Economics; Carbon-Dioxide Stock; Climate Change; Uncertainty; Carbon Tax; International Compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q52 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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http://www.uow.edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@ ... ts/doc/uow114609.pdf (application/pdf)
Working Paper: A Stock Targeting International Carbon-Tax Rule with Uncertainty and Diminishing Compliance (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uow:depec1:wp11-09
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