Coordination in Political Machinery under Dictatorship: Signals, Shirking and Repression

Grigory Kalyagin and Vladimir A. Kozlov
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Vladimir A. Kozlov: Department of Demography, National Research University - Higher School of Economics

No 1, Working Papers from Moscow State University, Faculty of Economics

Abstract: This paper is devoted to the explanation of selected bureaus' behavior patterns in the soviet type of totalitarian dictatorships with the command economic model. It is a proven fact that the plan figures in the soviet economy were fabricated as a consequence of intrigues and secret negotiations between different interested parties. Generally, bureaus, as rational agents that minimize risk and maximize slack, should have been interested in reducing the plan figures, nevertheless, they strived to increase them. As examples, mass repression under dictatorships and overexpenditure of an administrative leverage at elections in non-democratic and quasi- democratic countries can be observed. In the article we develop a simple model of coordination between principal (dictator) and his agents (bureaus), which explain the mentioned paradoxical situation.

Keywords: Dictatorship; Stalinism; Repression; Plan; Principal-Agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 N44 P00 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2012-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upa:wpaper:0001

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