Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

Gert Cornelissen (), Siegfried Dewitte and Luk Warlop

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one’s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator’s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently lead to a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Keywords: Dictator game; social dilemma; decision-making; two stage model; social value orientation, interpersonal closeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1028

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