Efficient interval scoring rules

Karl Schlag and Joël van der Weele

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefs are time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are valid only when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a class of rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) on the basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulate an e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single- peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of the belief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.

Keywords: Belief elicitation; scoring rules; subjective probabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1176

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