Are self-regarding subjects more rational?

Benito Arruñada, Marco Casari and Francesca Pancotto

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates to concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games and a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the selfregarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.

Keywords: steps of reasoning; other-regarding preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Are Self-regarding Subjects More Rational? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1306

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