The role of frames, numbers and risk in the frequency of cooperation

Antoni Bosch-Domènech () and Joaquim Silvestre

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We report on a simple experiment that addresses three factors in the frequency of cooperation: (i) framing, (ii) the number of players and (iii) the perceived risk of cooperating. We work with a (two-player) Prisoner’s Dilemma and with a three-player, two-strategy Public Good Game. These themes have been separately studied by a large number of experimental papers, using diverse methodologies. Our experiment targets them in a common, clear-cut framework. We find three strong effects (a) Framing; (b) The number of players (there is less cooperation in the three-person games that in the two-person ones); (c) The neutralization of risk (about 50% of participants cooperate when risk is neutralized). Both (a) and (c) go in the expected direction but, in all three cases, the strength of the effect is surprising.

Keywords: Cooperation; Framing; Prisoner's Dilemma; Risk; Public Good Game; Voluntary Contribution Game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D74 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1501

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