Securing property rights

Arnold Behrer, Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo Ponzetto and Andrei Shleifer

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice through legal skill, bribery, or physical force by the strong—the state or its powerful citizens—against the weak.We present evidence that undue influence on judges is a common concern in many countries, especially among the poor. We then present a model of a water polluter whose discharges contaminate adjacent land. If this polluter can subvert the assessment of damages caused by his activity, there is an efficiency case for granting the landowner the right to an injunction that stops the polluter, rather than the right to compensation for the harm. If the polluter can subvert even the determination of his responsibility for harm, there is an efficiency case for regulation that restricts pollution regardless of its effects. We then conduct an empirical analysis of water quality in the U.S. before and after the Clean Water Act, and show how regulation brought about cleaner water, particularly in states with higher corruption.

Keywords: Property Rights; Subversion; Liability; Injunction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 O17 P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09, Revised 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Securing Property Rights (2021)
Working Paper: Securing Property Rights (2016)
Working Paper: Securing Property Rights (2016)
Working Paper: Securing Property Rights (2016)
Working Paper: Securing Property Rights (2016)
Working Paper: Securing Property Rights (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1538

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