Dynamic nonmonetary incentives

Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time, and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, beneficial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (beneficial for the agent, costly for the principal) can be forbidden by the principal. We ask how rewards should be used and which investments incentivized. We identify the unique optimal mechanism and analyze the dynamic investment and compensation policies. When all rewards are identical, the unique optimal way to provide incentives is by a "carte-blanche" to pursue all rewards arriving in a predetermined timeframe.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; Uncertain action availability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Non-monetary Incentives (2019)
Working Paper: Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1545

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