Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition
Enriqueta Aragones and
Zvika Neeman ()
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Abstract:
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In the first stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity. Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustained in equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variable for the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the same electoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.
Keywords: Ambiguous platforms; ideological differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-01, Revised 1996-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition (1994) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:162
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