Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
Eric van Damme and
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.
Keywords: Duopoly; Stackelberg; equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership (1999)
Working Paper: Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:190
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