Keeping in the dark with hard evidence

Daniel Bird and Alexander Frug ()
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Alexander Frug: https://www.upf.edu/web/econ/faculty/-/asset_publisher/6aWmmXf28uXT/persona/id/3421088

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We present a dynamic learning setting in which the periodic data observed by the decision-maker is mediated by an agent. We study when, and to what extent, this mediation can distort the decision-maker’s long-run learning, even though the agent’s reports are restricted to consist of verifiable hard evidence and must adhere to certain standards. We introduce the manipulation-proof law of large numbers – that delivers a sharp dichotomy: when it holds, the decision-maker’s learning is guaranteed in the long-run; when it fails, the scope for manipulation is essentially unrestricted.

Keywords: manipulation; selective forced disclosure; long-run beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:1927

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