A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

Ramon Villanova (), Jaume Paradís () and Pelegrí Viader ()
Additional contact information
Ramon Villanova: https://www.upf.edu/web/econ/faculty/-/asset_publisher/6aWmmXf28uXT/persona/id/3418633
Pelegrí Viader: https://www.upf.edu/web/econ/faculty/-/asset_publisher/6aWmmXf28uXT/persona/id/3418630

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

Keywords: Cournot equilibrium; non-cooperative oligopoly; quasi-competitiveness; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/357.pdf Whole Paper (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:357

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).