On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

Esther Hauk and Sjaak Hurkens

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

Keywords: Forward induction; strategic stability; EES sets; index theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-07, Revised 1999-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:408

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