On the structural difference between the evolutionary approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob

Hans Jorgen Jacobsen, Mogens Jensen and Birgitte Sloth ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

Keywords: Evolutionary learning; coordination games; equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06, Revised 1999-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/477.pdf Whole Paper (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:477

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).