Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

Enriqueta Aragones and Andrew Postlewaite

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.

Keywords: Electoral campaigns; reputation; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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