Equilibrium unemployment insurance

John Hassler, Sevi Rodríguez Mora, Kjetil Storesletten and Fabrizio Zilibotti

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insurance into a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictions and on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populated by identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distribution of human capital across agents, may choose very different unemployment insurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interaction between the political decision about the level of the unemployment insurance and the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to a self-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-state equilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with high unemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist with an American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnover and low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model features two distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and duration rates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.

Keywords: Comparative advantege; employment; political equilibrium; search; specialization; unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E24 J24 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-04, Revised 1999-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance (1999)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance (1999)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:605

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