Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation
Doh-Shin Jeon ()
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the production cost under each project but also about the signal regarding the profitability of the risky project. If the signal favoring the adoption of the risky project is goods news to the agent, integrating production and project evaluation tasks does not generate any loss compared to the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the signal. By contrast, if it is bad news, task integration creates an endogenous reservation utility which is type-dependent and thereby generates countervailing incentives, which can make a bias toward either project optimal. Our results can offer an explanation for why good firms can go bad and a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions stressed by Williamson.
Keywords: Information flows; countervailing incentives; multitasking; asymmetric information; innovations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent, nep-mic and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:623
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().