Combating corruption in international business transactions

Marco Celentani (), Juan-José Ganuza and Jose-Luis Peydro

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions that require signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found to have bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penalties under a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions', in which signatory countries commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of any foreign country. We compare the results with the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to commit to prosecuting firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties on firms found to have bribed foreign public officials.

Keywords: International corruption; OECD convention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 F23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03, Revised 2003-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Combating Corruption in International Business Transactions (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:670

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