On equilibria in duopolies with finite strategy spaces

Kalyan Talluri ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

Keywords: duopoly; equilibria; revenue management; discrete-choice theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 C7 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:701

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