Eliciting consumers preferences using stated preference discrete choice models: Contingent ranking versus choice experiment

Anna Merino

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to carry out a theoretical review of the most recent stated preference techniques used for eliciting consumers preferences and, secondly, to compare the empirical results of two dierent stated preference discrete choice approaches. They dier in the measurement scale for the dependent variable and, therefore, in the estimation method, despite both using a multinomial logit. One of the approaches uses a complete ranking of full-profiles (contingent ranking), that is, individuals must rank a set of alternatives from the most to the least preferred, and the other uses a first-choice rule in which individuals must select the most preferred option from a choice set (choice experiment). From the results we realize how important the measurement scale for the dependent variable becomes and, to what extent, procedure invariance is satisfied.

Keywords: Stated preferences; contingent ranking; choice experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C42 C93 D12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econ-papers.upf.edu/papers/705.pdf Whole Paper (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:705

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (william.carlson@upf.edu this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).