An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior
Sergi Jimenez-Martin and
Alfonso Sanchez Martin ()
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Abstract:
In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare and retirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger.
Keywords: Retirement; life cycle model; minimum pension; structural estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D91 H22 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-10, Revised 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-eec, nep-lab, nep-pbe and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior (2015) 
Journal Article: An evaluation of the life cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior (2007) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:715
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